CNPC is the remnant of the former Petroleum Ministry, which was reorganized into a company in 1988. Since its creation, CNPC has looked after the country’s onshore oil and gas exploration and has maintained exclusive rights for onshore production sharing contracts.

CNOOC was established in 1982 when the oil ministry spun off the responsibility for offshore oil and gas exploration and development. CNOOC was given the exclusive rights for offshore production sharing contracts. In 1983, Sinopec was created to oversee China’s oil refining and petrochemical sector.

In 1998 the industry was overhauled, with the government redistributing upstream and downstream assets between CNPC and Sinopec. In the process, Sinopec was given sizeable upstream assets in eastern China in return for trading a number of refineries, gasoline stations, and other downstream businesses to CNPC. Although the restructuring strengthened Sinopec, CNPC retained the bulk of the country's oil and gas reserves as well as its domestic crude production dominance. It also made CNPC into an integrated company. CNOOC was largely ignored in the restructuring.

Shortly after the restructuring, the government decided to sell equity to the public, and Sinopec, CNPC, and CNOOC all went public in 2000. Since their initial public offerings, their stock valuations have soared; CNPC went from $15 to $158, CNOOC from $16.50 to $125, and Sinopec from $19 to $118.

Even though publicly listed, China’s three NOCs are still essentially controlled by the Chinese authorities. The central government dictates their strategies, assigns targets and objectives, and then allows them a relatively free hand on the tactical side. But the NOCs also shoulder the responsibility to ensure sufficient oil supply to Chinese consumers – at government-regulated prices.

The government, for example, recently issued a notice ordering the NOCs to increase their crude production and reduce or eliminate their refined product exports to ensure adequate domestic supplies. The statement served to remind the NOCs of their responsibility for the integrity of the domestic market. (Over the past few months, CNPC and Sinopec have been exporting large quantities of refined oil products in an effort to compensate for the poor domestic margins they are forced to absorb.)

There have been some spasmodic movements to liberalize China’s domestic energy scene but nothing of substance has happened. Culturally, relinquishing control in such a sensitive area would be quite un-Chinese. While the country grows by leaps and bounds and energy demand is surging, the government simply cannot afford a free-for-all energy market and the higher consumer prices that might come with it.

Chinese NOCs have been raising investment to maximize the potential of their domestic upstream assets and increase security of supply. The combined domestic exploration and development budgets of the three companies rose from $12.6 billion in 2004 to $21.5 billion in 2006. This is an increase of $8.9 billion, nearly double the increase in overseas expenditures in the same time period, according to Wood Mackenzie.

Upstream field development expenditure rates of China’s NOCs have increased beyond most of the larger international companies. In 2006, CNPC’s upstream investments exceeded $9.40 per barrel of oil equivalent, far above the $7.50 per boe average rate of the international majors. Sinopec and CNOOC had investment rates of around $12 per boe, nearly double the cost of their international peers.

Increased upstream investments have led to major oil and gas discoveries in Bohai Bay and Sichuan Province, and boosted the ability of China's NOCs to supply oil and gas from domestic fields. But the fast-rising import dependency has compelled China to continuing seeking oil and gas reserves around the globe to provide the country with secure sources of energy. Thus, total overseas expenditures by the three NOCs has increased substantially over the last two years, and reached $8 billion in 2006.

In 2006, acquisitions accounted for around 70 percent of the total amount spent internationally by Chinese companies, with the remainder in exploration and field development activities. Internationally, the acquisition and exploration strategies of the NOCs more or less amplify the government’s diplomatic policies. The Chinese companies are reinforcing their ties with the major producing countries, including Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. For example, the three have all been offered onshore gas acreages in Iran.

Downstream, Chinese NOCs are seizing as much of the market as they can by consolidating their positions in oil refining and distribution, to make the most of what may prove to be the beginning of the end of their monopoly. Last December, China opened up its oil wholesale market, but the liberalization was more symbolic than anything else. Nevertheless, the NOCs feel threatened by powerful overseas competitors. While seeking to raise their market shares in the wholesale and retail sectors, they have embarked on plans to expand their refining capacities to insulate themselves from incoming supermajors like Shell, BP, and Exxon Mobil.

Daqing holds an important position in China’s history. The discovery of the giant field in the late 1950s prompted one prominent Chinese official to declare in December 1963 that the “days are gone when China uses foreign oil.” But by 1993, history had proven him wrong, as China once again became a net crude importer. Today, China can’t survive without foreign oil. In the first seven months of this year, China imported 96.4 million tons of crude oil (about 3.35 million barrels per day), rising 15 percent over the same period in 2006. During the same time, domestic crude production only rose about 1.1 percent to about 3.8 million bpd.

Looking ahead, the NOCs will remain focused on securing China's resource needs from both domestic and overseas sources while encouraging competition. In terms of the energy mix, non-coal energy is heavily geared towards oil, which makes up almost 25 percent of total energy use. Natural gas, with its lower emissions levels, will become increasingly important as China grapples with severe pollution. Although natural gas makes up only about 3 percent of primary energy use, it is expected to grow to over 8 percent in the next decade, as transmission infrastructure is built and prices reach levels that make gas investments attractive. Despite an increased use of oil and gas, coal will still account for the vast majority of the country’s primary energy use.

Thus, while coal will remain king and gas use will double over the next few years, it’s obvious that China’s transportation sector is absorbing all of the oil that it can find. Booming markets for new automobiles and domestic air travel will continue to drive double-digit growth rates in China’s oil consumption. And that in turn means that Sinopec, CNPC, and CNOOC will be dominating China’s oil and gas industry for many years to come.