In the North American energy business, the words “gas exports” do not usually appear in the same sentence as “from Mexico.” But get ready, because Mexico has recently increased its production and LNG imports, slashed pipeline imports to a trickle, and looks poised to start shipping gas north this year.

In recent issues, we have addressed the complex relationships within the North American gas industry among the price drivers of increasing US shale gas production, decreasing Canadian gas exports, uncertain LNG import levels, and declining US demand levels. Sorting through the interplay between these drivers and North American gas price levels has knotted many brows across the industry. The Mexican gas industry may soon compound that consternation.

According to the US Energy Information Agency, Mexico has been a net importer of US natural gas since 1990. Mexican gas imports peaked at 1.8 bcf/d in 2004, declined gradually to 1.3 bcf/d by 2006, and then plummeted to 0.4 bcf/d in 2008. Mexico is poised to achieve a positive net export balance for natural gas in 2009-2012.

The reversal of trade flows will be dramatic. The 48-inch Pemex trunkline that connects the major oil and gas reserves of southeast Mexico to markets in northeast Mexico and Texas was originally built to facilitate large-scale Mexican exports to the US. Contrary to that intent, the Pemex system has instead served as a major import corridor for US supplies. Now it may after all serve its original purpose.

It did not function as originally planned because, for several decades, Mexican gas production has been consistently lower than consumption. This was the product of a disparity in investment between the robust private programs for natural gas delivery infrastructure and power generation, and the inadequate public investment in natural gas production, which is the exclusive responsibility of the state oil and gas company, Pemex.

Slathering on the Supply

Between 2006 and 2008, Mexico increased domestic gross gas production from 5.5 to 6.2 bcf/d, and net production from 3.4 to 3.9 bcf/d. The approximate 0.5 bcf/d increase in net production kept pace with a 0.5 bcf/d increase in demand, from 4.3 bcf/d in 2006 to an estimated 4.8 bcf/d in 2008.

However, Mexico has also added another 0.5 bcf/d of LNG imports through two new terminals, one in Ensenada just south of San Diego and the other in Altamira on the Gulf Coast. The LNG imports to date have utilized only a fraction of the terminals’ capacity, but they have already enabled Mexico to decrease its average pipeline imports from the US from 0.9 bcf/d in 2006 to approximately 0.4 bcf/d in 2008.

During earlier years, approximately 0.4 bcf/d of these imports supplied northwest Mexico’s isolated, import-dependent systems in Baja California and Sonora, across the border from Arizona. The balance of imports occurred on the Mexican pipeline system that ties to a handful of cross-border pipeline connections in west and southeast Texas.

The imports into northwest Mexico from California and Arizona have remained relatively constant, while the imports from Texas have declined from 0.5 bcf/d in 2006 to almost zero in 2008. Mexico’s gas balance is summarized in the Table 1.

Table 1

Mexican gas production grew throughout 2008 as the government provided Pemex with increasing financial resources to invest in oil production. Since the majority of Mexican gas production is associated with oil, imports of gas from Texas into the Mexican interconnects have steadily dropped.

Shifting Trade into Reverse

Mexico hit the brakes on imports of US pipeline gas in 2008 and it will probably shift them into reverse this year, generating a net export balance with Texas in 2009 and possibly with the US overall by 2010, when exports to Texas may grow to exceed the ongoing steady imports from California and Arizona.

In 2009-2012, our projections suggest that Mexican gas exports to the US could be as high as 0.5 bcf/d this year and could grow to as much as 1.3 bcf/d by 2012. Over this period, there is an approximate 0.6 bcf/d to 0.7 bcf/d variation between our high and low forecasts for Mexican production, LNG supply, and demand. These results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Over the next few years, the reversal of US-Mexican gas trade will be driven by three key trends:

• Short-term economic recession followed by gradual recovery, yielding relatively flat gas demand through 2010 and moderate increases thereafter.

• Continued dramatic Mexican production increases in early 2009, followed by a production plateau over the ensuing years.

• Continued significant increases in Mexican LNG imports that will absorb both existing underutilized terminal capacity and the 500 MMcf/d of new capacity slated to come online in late 2011 in Manzanillo, on the Pacific Coast near Guadalajara.

The Mexican supply-demand balance has been significantly impacted by the credit crisis. The abrupt slowdown in gross domestic product growth in late 2008 and expectations for negative GDP growth in 2009 have taken a heavy toll on expectations for electricity demand, causing the state power company CFE to adjust its capacity plan and defer some of its major natural gas CCGT and repower projects by several years. The economic slowdown has also reduced expectations for industrial gas demand.

While the credit crisis has dented Mexican gas demand, it has had an opposite, positive impact on the outlook for Mexican gas production by accelerating significant sector reforms and investment programs. The credit crisis may turn out to be a boon to Mexican production precisely because it came at such an unfavorable time for the Mexican government and Pemex, and opened a window of opportunity to enact substantial energy reform. The Mexican government depends on heavy taxation of Pemex, which earns most of its money from exporting crude oil. For several years, Pemex’s oil reserves and production have declined due to budget limitations that resulted in inadequate investment in exploration and production. By mid-2008, accelerated production declines at major fields such as Cantarell escalated Pemex’s investment constraints to the top of the national agenda. When the credit crisis struck and further restricted Pemex’s access to capital, significant reform became imperative.

President Calderon, a former Energy Minister and strong supporter of energy reform, used the political window of opportunity presented by the credit crisis to secure congressional support for substantial changes in Mexican energy laws and regulations. With great effort and despite considerable resistance, Calderon’s administration secured passage of historic reform legislation in October of 2008. While modest in scope by international standards, the Mexican reforms are historic for a country with a long tradition of resource nationalism that is enshrined in a constitutionally-mandated state monopoly on oil and gas production.

The reforms immediately free up Pemex financial resources for a redoubled E&P investment campaign. They also include long-term measures designed to attract and secure greater levels of private investment in the sector. Although the long-term measures will be challenging to translate into successful results, the substantial short-term financial resources available to Pemex are already reversing Mexico’s long history of underinvestment to the benefit oil and gas production.

The Pemex investment campaign is focused on oil production, but associated gas production will also benefit. Mexico’s hydrocarbon reserve replacement rate already has improved substantially – to over 100 percent – after many years of much lower results. In 2008, associated gas production growth accounted for most of the increased Mexican gas output.

Additionally, Pemex has immediate opportunities to significantly reduce gas flaring and increase available gas supply. Pemex flaring rates were below 5 percent of total production a few years ago, but have since climbed to almost 23 percent of production. By investing in the gas gathering and processing infrastructure needed to bring the waste volumes to market, Pemex can substantially increase its production results in the short term, and doing so is among Pemex’s stated priorities.

Putting a Point on Price

Our base case forecasts for North American natural gas prices suggest that the approximately 600- to 740-MMcf/d variation between our high and low scenarios for Mexican gas exports could generate price variations of about 5 to 7 percent, or approximately $0.25 to $0.35 per MMBtu in a given year, assuming a $4.75 to $5.25 price environment.

In 2009, for example, the difference between marginal Mexican imports of 136 MMcf/d and net exports of 455 MMcf/d suggests that the downward price pressure associated with the high export scenario is on the order of $0.25 per MMBtu. These relationships are plotted in the figure below.

Figure 1

The reversal of US -Mexican trade volumes in the coming years will represent no more than two percent of North American demand. However, as a new source of marginal supply to the larger North American market, Mexican gas exports to the US will be large enough to increase the downward price pressure associated with softened demand and growing shale and LNG supply. Uncertainty around the level and timing of new and increasing Mexican exports could also contribute to price volatility.

Christopher Goncalves is a director at Navigant Consulting with 18 years of financial and energy industry experience.