Well, wouldn’t it be even more bizarre if that same energy executive were to be appointed to that top position, while he keeps his corporate job? This is exactly what happened in Russia last November when Vladimir Putin announced that Dmitri Medvedev would become the first deputy prime minister. It’s a good job for Medvedev, particularly because he gets to keep his day job as chairman of the Russian gas giant Gazprom. But the promotion of Medvedev has barely raised an eyebrow.

Less than two years remain before the Russian presidential elections in 2008, and the subject of Vladimir Putin’s successor is one the hottest and most intriguing debates in Russia. Putin is constitutionally barred from running again (though he is allowed to run again four years later). In a country where power has been re-concentrating at an alarming rate, it is nearly certain that one of Putin’s protégés will be elected to replace him. And there is some probability that whoever gets the top job will simply keep the seat warm until Putin runs again in 2012.

The jockeying has already begun with a major reshuffling at the top-level posts in the Kremlin. The most important of these is Medvedev’s promotion, which could mean that he is the heir apparent.

In the reshuffle, defense minister Sergei Ivanov, also mentioned as a prospective presidential candidate, was appointed as deputy prime minister while retaining his previous ministry. To the Moscow News and other papers perceived to be close to the Administration, the moves were seen as a clear indicator that the president was pushing his preferred successors closer to the limelight. While it was unclear which is the more favored candidate, analysts said Putin was betting on Medvedev, keeping Ivanov as a back-up. The vacated post of chief of staff – formerly held by Medvedev – was taken over by the even lesser-known Sergei Sobyanin, the governor of the Tyumen region. Putin’s appointment of Ivanov seems like a concession to the siloviki as a way of keeping a balance of power among powerful political elites.

The new appointments become more comprehensible considering their relationship to two of the dominant political camps, which have direct connection to Russia’s energy giants. The leader of the first camp is Medvedev. His appointment as deputy prime minister strengthens that camp and Gazprom itself. An opposing camp is led by Igor Sechin, who, like Medvedev, holds positions in government (deputy head of the Putin administration) and in the energy sector (chairman of Rosneft).

Most political analysts believe that these two deputy prime ministers have the best chances to succeed Putin. A poll conducted by the Levada Analytical Center in July showed that 25 percent of respondents support Medvedev’s candidacy while 16 percent support Ivanov. This scenario seems plausible but it may prove too simplistic. The poll also showed that 59 percent of respondents would prefer Putin to extend his presidency for a third term despite the constitutional prohibition. A large fraction of the responders, 43 percent, said they would vote for the candidate explicitly endorsed by Putin.

There are, of course, other points of view. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the Duma deputy speaker and leader of the opposition liberal-democratic party, believes that Putin sees neither Ivanov nor Medvedev as the real candidates. Zhirinovsky thinks that they have appeared on the political stage too early. Many progressive politicians share the same opinion. This point of view got a big boost by Putin himself at a press conference during the Shanghai Summit in June, when he reiterated that there is no chance to amend the constitution for him to run for a third term. Addressing questions about his probable successor, Putin responded that the person could be somebody currently unknown and not necessarily on the short list of two (a clear allusion to Medvedev and Ivanov).

The traditional secrecy and non-transparency of the current Russia power structure breeds wild speculation. The higher and more important the post, the more unexpected may be the appearance of the eventual holder. Putin himself was a virtual unknown when he was promoted to prime minister in the Yeltsin administration. Such secrecy protects a candidate against intrigues, political rivals, and public opinion. Most analysts believe that the actual candidate will be introduced by being appointed prime minister – mimicking Putin’s own path. Recently, some analysts have speculated about a new dark-horse candidate, Sergey Chemezov, who seems to be emerging as a probable successor to the current prime minister, Mikhail Fradkov. And that could position Chemezov as Putin’s successor. According to the Kommersant Vlast newspaper, Chemezov worked with Putin in the KGB in East Germany, and in 1996, they worked together at the Kremlin. Since April 2004, Chemezov has been the director general of Rosoboronexport, the state agency handling Russia’s weapons exports, a very successful enterprise with confirmed contracts amounting to $17 billion.

Regardless of what may happen, one thing is certain: the 2008 election will assure that the current Kremlin clan retains power, and Putin won’t be far from the action.